RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR INJURY RESULTING
FROM NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT IMPACT.
Perhaps upon no question presented within recent years
has there been so much conflict in the decisions of courts of
the highest authority, as upon that of the right to recover
for negligence which causes no direct physical impact,
but where an appreciable physical injury ensues in consequence of a fright or nervous shock produced thereby. A
recovery has been allowed by the Court of King's Bench in
England,' Exchequer in Ireland. 2 and the Supreme Courts
of Texas.' MIinnesota 4 and South Carolina.5 A recovery
has been denied by the Privy Council, England,0 and the
Supreme Courts of New York,7 Pennsylvania8 and Massachusetts."
M\luch of the difficulty has arisen from considering the
right to recover damages for some particular hurt, in an
action of negligence as a whole, governed by a uniform
rule; and yet the right may depend upon any of these questions:
i. Has the defendant been guilty of any act of negligence
toward the plaintiff?
2. Has the plaintiff suffered any legal damage in consequence?
3- If so, can he recover for this specific hurt as an item
of compensation?
These three questions are each governed by their individual rules, each by its own considerations of general utility
Dulieu v. WVhite, L. R. 19Oi, 2 K. B. 669.
'Bell v. R. R., L. R.. 26 Ir. Rep. 428 (I8go).
'R. R. Co. v. Hayter, 93 Texas, 243 (19oo).
"Purcellv. R. R., 48 Minn. 134 (1892).
'Mack v. R. R., 29 So. Rep. 9o5 (I898), and dictum, 1897, in Cal.
N oum v. R. R., iii Cal. 669 (1888).
'Coultas v. R. R., L. R. 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888).
SMitchell v. R. R., x51 N. Y. 107 (1897).
'Ewing v. R. R., 147 Pa. 40 (1892).
'Spade v. R. R., 168 Mass. 285 (1898), and dictum Braun v. Craven,
175 II. 403 (899).
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and public policy, and by different rules and conceptions
of proximate cause and effect, and of what does and does not
constitute recoverable damages.
First-The Conception of Legal Iniurmy is Quite Different.-It will be found that certain forms of very real detriment, such as fright, mental suffering and nervous shock,
are not, standing alone, injury sufficient to call for precautions to guard against their infliction, nor do they constitute
damage, where damage is the gist of the action, but that
they may where other sufficient damage has been shown,
and so a right of action established, be allowed as items of
compensation. Why is this?
In fact such suffering was never included in the legal conception"° of injury-a harm done to a right-that conception which the courts applied when the matter came before
them for determination. In all such cases i it was some
material tangible harm which was conceived as legal injury.
Probably many reasons underlay this conception. In the
first place mental suffering was comparatively trivial in the
great majority of cases, sometimes, perhaps, it was considerable, but the effort of the Common Law has been to
lay down rules of general application, and not to provide
for every exceptional contingency. 12 There is no legal right
to absolute peace and quiet; such an ideal existence cannot
be enjoyed amidst a complex civilization. Some rights must
be foregone that the business of life may be carried on. So
there is no right to freedom from fright, mental suffering,
" This is in conformity with what 0. W. Holmes, Jr. C. J., so
forcibly calls the "Externality of the Common Law," which regards
the physical manifestation, not the cause or effect, as the wrongful act
or the legal injury.
'As in actions on contracts where the measure of damages is for
the court as a matter of interpretation of the contract. Here the court
specifies the items of compensation, the jury merely valuing them, and
deciding other issues of fact incidentalli arising; and has never except
in a few Western states in the United States, allowed mental suffering,
no matter how inherent in the breach, how evidently in contemplation
of the parties to be considered as such an item, except in actions of
breach of promise of marriage, which are in truth more nearly alike to
torts than contract cases.
' See Spade v. R. R., 168 Mass. 285 (I898).
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or nervous shock, a breach of which is legal- injuty, an act
probably injurious to which is regarded as wrongful. Such
injuries must rest where they fall, they are too frequent and
too unimportant for the law to interrupt the business of the
community and of its courts, to grant the protection either
of preliminary precaution to prevent them or of a right of
action to recover damages for them if they occur. Equally
cogent with this conception when first formulated, though no
longer valid,' 3 was the practical impossibility of administering any other rule, the parties being incompetent to testify.
The courts were quite ignorant of what took place, they
had to be placed in possession of the facts before they. could
act. In action of tort' 4 both the fact of the wrong and tfie extent of the injury catsed thereby was reported to the-court
by the jury to whose knowledge, as representing tlik general knowledge of the community the parties had, in theory
voluntarily, appealed as decisive.' 5
No fact could be legally irmpor.tant which could not be made
by some legal means, to appear to -the court for its action.
Acts were either notorious, 16 as such a part of the connusance of the pais, that general knowledge 6o one's neighbor's
affairs even now common in small communities, or at least
capable of perception by the senses and so proper matter for
the testimony of a witness competent as having that special
knowledge which comes from having personally seen and
heard.
Thus, the difficulty of proof' 7 was added to the compara" Since now it is practically universal that the parties are competent
witnesses.
"4 Other than certain actions for injury to property, both real and
personal, when the courts assumed a more specific control over the
jury's action on the question of damage.
Supplemented .by the special knowledge of persons who had seen
and heard the events, and so were competent to be witnesses as experts
as to these facts.
"And the tendency of the early law was to require if possible some
act striking and open, so as to be easily embodied in the general knowledge of the vicinage as Hue and cry, dower at the church door; livery
of seizin, etc.
'Expressed in the maxim: "The thoughts of man are not triable."
Brian C J., the jury don't know-them, and the only source of information, the man himself, is unavailable.
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tive triviality of the harm and as the tendency of the Common Law is to provide for general conditions and not exceptional cases of hardship, the fact that sometimes the
injury was in reality considerable' 8 did not tend to disturb
the strict application of the rule that only tangible material
harm was legal injury.
Probably the difficulty' 9 of proof standing alone might
not have been sufficient to bar recovery had there been a
right to peace of mind, regarded as worthy of protection and
redress, for the jury is directed to consider such sufferings
in computing the damages where a cause of action has been
shown, and from the first moment when the court assumed
the power to control and direct the jury's action as to
damages, they have been required to find upon evidence,
not to guess about matters not within their legal knowledge,20 and were such injuries incapable of legal proof, so
much of their verdict as represented such suffering would
have been without evidence to support it.
In truth such suffering is either inherent in and a necessary
concomitant of the wrong committed 2' or the injury sustained, 22 or the testimony which proves the one or the other
does disclose its existence evidenced by some material manifestation. 2 3 Probably the courts did not disturb the jury's
'Such suffering is in a vast majority of cases trivial. In a few instances it may be considerable. Tangible physical injury, while it may
be sometimes trivial, is almost always considerable.
"The proof was not one-sided as is often now said to be a reason for
refusing recovery, for the plaintiff could not testify.
" The court could of course never revise the jury's findings as to
damages or indeed on any matter of fact until they ceased to report the
general knowledge of the vicinage and had become a body whose
function was to judge the facts presehted to their attention by evidence,
debarred from proceeding on the private knowledge of its members
unless stated in open court.
" See Woods' notes to Mayne on Damages, p. 74, generally accepted
and cited as a correct statement of the rule (147 Pa. 4o), "The mental
suffering is such as grows out of the sense of peril or mental agony at
the time of the accident.
" "And that which is incident to and blended with the bodily pain
incident to the injury and the apprehension and anxiety thereby induced."
' When, too, the injuries are personal, it follows naturally; when
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findings because there was some if not much evidence for
their finding, the allowance of such damages being itself
an anomaly growing out of the jury's unrestrained and
unrestrainable freedom of action in the determination of
matters of fact.2 4 The jury looked at the real not the legal
injury suffered by the plaintiff; the court had no power
by which they could enforce on them their own conceptions,
and so they always looked at the wrong as a whole, the
defendant's conduct and what they thought the plaintiff had
suffered; in the rough-what they would take to undergo
such treatment,-and on this basis awarded the damages.
When the court obtained power to control and direct the
action of the jury, the practice had become inveterate for the
jury to give damages on this basis to an extent palpably
greater than any possible value of the mere legal injury, and
instead of reducing such verdicts to the limits of compensation for the exact legal injury, the courts explained them by
saying that the jury had considered the misbehavior of the
defendant, and the agony and pain of the plaintiff, and approved them, finding that on the whole justice was served by
allowing the consideration of such items, and so adopted
them into the rules in which they have gradually formulated
the measure of damages. The difficulties of proof, while
serious enough to infl-uence the court in conjunction with the
other reasons to deny redress for such things as are themselves actionable injury are found not serious enough or
actual enough to warrant the court in interfering with a long
established and generally wholesome practice.
the injury is to property such suffering results naturally only under

exceptional circumstances; normally, ifo. such consequences ensue. Nor
is such suffering inherent in either the wrong committed or
the injury sustained. Nor does the evidence proving the one or the
other usually disclose its existence. So in cases of injury to property,
it required proof of peculiar circumstances to let in such suffering as an
item of damage: White v. Dresser, 135 Mass. i5o (1883). Where the
circumstances of the wrong were such that such sufferings were natural,
damages could be recovered for them: Fillibrown v. Hoar, 124 Mass.
580 (1878).
" Itself arising from the fact that as anciently the jury proceeded on
its own knowledge, and not on evidence, the court not possessing the
knowledge could not tell whether the verdict was correct or not. This
could only be done by another greater jury, the attaint jury.
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A failure to realize that the normal conception of recoverable injury is something material and tangible, and that
the allowance of compensation for mental sufferings in tort
cases is an anomaly resulting from the original functions of
the jury in such cases, and their absolute liberty in their findings of fact, has led to a number of reasons being given in an
effort to explain whv such suffering: is not sufficient damage
to support an action. The principal being:
I. That it is too remote. It is enough to say of this that
it is difficult to see why a result which is so remote that a
man is not responsible for it if it alone occur, can become
a proper subject of compensation by the same person, because he has actually caused some other harm to the plaintiff.
2. That it is against Public Policv.
(a) Because to
allow it, would be to encourage litigation. But as litigation
is merely devised as a means by which an injury done by a
wrong to a right may be redressed, it is a contradiction to
the letter and spirit of law and justice to refuse redress by
litigation if a legal injury is caused to a legal right by an
act which is only wrongful because it threatens injury.
(b) Such injury is too delicate a matter for the scales of
justice to weigh.
(c) The proof is too one sided. Its nature and extent
can only appear from the testimony of the plaintiff practically incapable of corroboration or contradiction. (This
reason is at best modern since parties have only recently become competent to testify.)
If these objections mean that the harm is too trivial to
be regarded as injury, the right of peace of mind too unimportant, too easy to offend, too difficult to protect, to be regarded as a legal right, and that the difficulty of proof being
added as another reason such suffering is not legal injurythey fairly state the law but they are open to the criticism
that, as stated, they equally apply to exclude consideration
by a jury of such suffering in the assessment of the damages,
for if the scales of justice cannot weigh so delicate a matter,
surely it is too nice a matter for the far rougher decision of
a jury; if it be one sided in proof, easy to fabricate, hard
to controvert, surely it is unjust that such evidence should
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enlarge the amount levied upon the defendant. And, as will
be seen, it has led to the idea that when mental suffering or
nervous shock forms a direct link in the chain of cause and
effect some reason of public policy forbids recovery though
tangible physical damage such as the courts have always
considered a legal injury has -resulted from the wrong
through the medium of such shock or suffering.
Even where there is an intent to frighten as in Downton v. Wilkinson,241a the act was wrongful not because intended to frighten the plaintiff, and so an injury to her peace
of mind, but because it wa-L an act willfully done calculated
to cause physical harm to the plaintiff, i. e., to intringe her
legal right to personal safety, and was actionable because in
fact it caused physical harm to her. It was becauge of the
inherent necessary tendency of such language to cause some
physical disturbance that the act was wrongful, and it
'was no answer to"say.,that the effect was greater than was
anticipated. That is commonly the case with all wrongs.
Second-The Conception of Proximate Cause and Effect
Also Varies with the Question Presented.-The existence
of negligence depends upon broad considerations of general
utility, of public policy as consisting of convenience of the
community as a whole, upon what protection can be given
to the person and property of one citizen without unduly
hampering the liberty of the others; and so no act is wrongful as being negligent unless it threaten a probable injury
to some person or class .of persons, an injury to a right
sufficiently important to be worth preserving even at the'
cost of the restricted freedom of the wrnngr-doer_an injury
grave enough to warrant tbh imposition of prennatinns to
nrevent it.
The existence of the wrong of negligence depends not
on what has happened, but upon what might reasonablyhave been foreseen -as likely to happen when the act was
done. Otherwise every man would act at the peril of having to answer for all the harm he might cause.
No act can be said to be negligent as to the plaintiff,
unless the average man if in the defendant's position know"a L.

. '97, 2 Q. B. 5.
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ing what he did or should have known, should have regarded
injury to the plaintiff25 likely to result if care were not
taken. This probability of injury raises the duty of care.
So, too, the act done (the duty of care being shown to exist),
must be a failure to observe that standard of care which
the circumstances would lead "the normal citizen" to think
necessary to guard against the dangers reasonably to be anticipated as likely to result from his adtions. The jury,
twelve men drawn at random from the community, and so
supposed in the aggregate fairly to represent the viewpoint of the average man, must put itself in the defendant's
place at the time he acted and judge of his action by the
probable consequences of it. If no harm were then probable
the act does not become negligent because injury actually
follows, nor will it be the less negligent if injury were
threatened because in fact none resulted. No Action will
lie because wrong and damage must unite, not because the
act was not wrongful. Where the liability in a negligence
case turns upon the existence of negligence, the rule often
announced as applicable generally, that liability is to be
limited to the natural and probable consequences of the act
done2 6 is absolutely correct.
When, however, the act is proved or admitted to be negligence and so wrongful, it remains to establish some legal
injury resulting therefrom, as its legal proximate consequence, to make it actionable.27 Here the act being wrongful, the wrong-doer must answer for all the consequences
which flow in an unbroken natural sequence from his act,
not merely those he could have foreseer 8
' Or some class of which plaintiff was o,*.

Allen, 3., Spade v.. R. R., x68 Mass. 285; -Paxsort, Ch. J., Hoag v.
R. R., 85 Pa. 293 (877), and many other cases announcing a similar
rule in varying language.
' As in almost all actions on the case. -The act is wrongful as
threatening harm; it is actionable because harm results.
' It will be found that even in those jurisdictions where the rule
of responsibility is generally broadly stated as for the probable conse-

quences alone, that it is a practice modified, whenever the negligence is
proved or admitted to exist, into a rule in effect allowing a recovery
for all the natural consequences though unforeseeable. Redress to
the person injured for whose protection the act was made wrongful
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The jury, for here again they are to judge except in cases
admitting of no twb opinions, must look not at what the defendant might have expected, but at what has actually taken
place, and say whether looking back at the completed whole
the injury sustained is the consequence of the wrong assisted
by nothing but the usual natural forces, and working out its
injurious tendencies in accordance with the recognized and
known laws of cause and effect. Of course if a cause unconnected with the wrong intervene, and divert those consequences to some new and different end, then the injury is no
longer the result of defendant's wrong, but of the new cause.
Natural and not probable consequence is here the legal conception of proximate result.
Negligence and injury being shown and the action thus
established, how far is the defendant liable, how is it to be
determined, what part of the ensuing harm is to be compensated by him, which conception of proximate cause controls? Exactly the same as in ascertaining the existence of
actionable injury-the natural effects until diverted-but
the conception is in no wise extended. If a certain injury
is not a natural consequence, so as to constitute damage, it is
too remote to be considered as an item of compensation.
The court in all actions of tort from the first moment
when it assumed any control over and direction of the
jury in assessing damages therein, even. for intentional
wrongs has always excluded evidence of injuries which
have not resulted naturally from the defendant's acts, and
has always when this may not be possible 9 directed the
jury that they must not consider any damage not so resulting. and this in accordance with elemental natural justice.
While it is proper that the plaintiff shall recover for all he
has suffered from the defendant's acts, there is no reason
why he should be remunerated at the defendant's expense
for consequences in no wise attributable to the latter. This
is the object, ,ot mercy for the wrongdoer: Hill v. Winsor, nS Mass.
251 (i875) ; Oil City v. Robinson, 99 Pa. I (1881) ; Hogsett v. Bunting,
139 Pa. 363 (189o).
See ANERICA-N LAW REGISTER, February and
March, igoi. Proximate Cause in Negligence Cases, Vol. 4o, N. S.,
PP. 79 and IS.
' As where it is impossible to dissever in proof the proximate from
the remote.
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is no more proper than to give a right of recovery for harm
suffered against one whose act has not injured the plaintiff
at all.
It is to be remembered in determining the natural effects
of a wrong, that the laws of nature and their operation are
now infinitely better understood than ever before.
In cases of injury to the person, the connection between
the original inciting cause and the final physical deterioration, is now capable of accurate diagnosis and proof by
medical testimony, 30 while no such proof in the majority of
cases was possible some generations ago.
It must also be noted that even conscious human action 3 '
is not an independent interveninz agent, if the action is in
accordance with the recognized customary habits governing
human conduct under the circumstances created by the
wrongful act, such action is but a natural consequence of
the wrong, such habits are part of the known natural forces
which assist but do not divert the injurious tendencies of
the wrong. Surely if the action, whether of a man, either
the plaintiff32 or a third person,3 3 or even an animal 34 is not
an intervening agent, the direct action upon the body of the
fright or shock caused by the wrong, is if possible even less
a break in the chain of natural effect. It is more direct, more
natural, more usual, the interposition of a conscious human
intelligence is removed and the injury caused by it is by so
much a more closely proximate consequence.
From the foregoing it would appear:
I. That no act is negligent unless it appear to threaten
a reasonably probabre injury.
" Palles, C. B., Bell v. R. R., L. R., 26, Ir. R. 428 (18go). "The relation between fright and injury to the nerve and brain structures is a
matter which depends entirely upon scientific and medical testimony."
"These cases will serve to illustrate this well known principle:
Lane v. Ati. Works, iii Mass. 136 (1872); Jones v. Boyce, i Starkie,
493 (1816).
't Vallo v. Ex. Co., 147 Pa. 404; Twomley v. R. R., 69 N. Y. 158

(1877). See cases cited, § 89 Sherman and Redfield on Negligence.
' Vandenberg v. Truax, 4 Denio, 464 (1847).
"Harris v. Mobbs, L. R. 3 Ex. Div. 268, 4 Denio. 464 (1847), and the
innumerable similar cases where the injury results from an accident
caused by fright of a horse induced by defendant's negligence.
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2. No negligent act is actionable unless injury result
therefrom as a proximate, i. e., natural result.
3- In either case the iniurv which is threatened or results
must be a material, tangible injury.
.Tfere tright, mental suffering or nervous shock has never
I
been, nor is now regarded by the courts as legal injury.
4. Neither fright nor mental or nervous shock is too remote for recovery, they may be considered by the jury in
awarding damages as items for compensation; nor are the
consequences of fright, etc., too remote; they, too, may be
considered.
5. Fright or nervous shock, not mere continued grief or
mental distress, if resulting naturally from defendant's
negligence and itself causing action involuntary as being
under the compulsion of the fright on the part of some person, either plaintiff himself, or third person, or even an
animal, injurious to plaintiff, is not an intervening agent,
but a usual natural force, its effect but an operation ot recugnized laws of cause and effect, in fact it is but a link in the
chain of causation between the wrong and the injury.
The only question remaining in doubt is whether an action
lies (I) where the act threatens probable mazeriaW phy~sal
injurv (as by direct imnct), and (2) where physical injury
has been in fact suffered, but where there has be= 1G &rect
impact (this generally due more to good luck than any effort
of the defendaat to repair his carelessness) and it is shown
by competent medical testimony that physical injury results
naturally from the fright or shock, itself undoubtedly a
natural consequence of the wrong.
Three cases deny recovery for substantially similar rea.,34a the defendant's act was unsons: In &itchIeL v. R?
it
was
by mere good luck that there was
doubtedly negligent,
no direct impact, the fri ght was an almost inevitable result
of the accident, and from it physical injury, a miscarriage,
followed naturally.
In Victoria R. R. v. Coultas,34b the damage was again a
miscarriage resulting from a severe fright due to the gate'"aL.1 N. Y.

7 (86).

"bL. R. 13 A. C. 222.
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keeper, at a level crossing of the railroad, shutting down the
safety gates while the plaintiff, driving in a carriage was
within, the gatekeeper having invited her to cross, while a
train was approaching, which in fact almost struck her.
In Ewing v. R. R.,34c the case came up on demurrer to the
plaintiff's declaration, which alleged that in consequence of
the plaintiff's negligence, a collision occurred upon their line,
being immediately adjacent to the plaintiff's residence, in
consequence of which, a car fell upon the house in which she
was seated, causing her intense fright and nervous shock
resulting in permanent physical disability.
In each case- the court gives several reasons for its decision, two of them being the same in all three. (I) That the
action is brought to recover for the fright, the physical injury being mei ely matter of aggravation, and so, if recovery
be given it must also be allowea when fright alone ensue.
As to this first reason, the court in . litclell v. R. R., says:
"These results (the shock and miscarriage), merely show
the severity of the fright and the extent of the damages,"
and so that the right of action depends on "whether a recovery may be had for fright ;" if so, an action lies "no matter how slight the injury," if not there can be no recovery,
"no matter how grave the consequences;" and after correctly deciding that mere fright will not be sufficient to support the action, not noticing that this is because no injury
which the court considers damage has been shown, they
leap to the conclusion that there can be no recovery when
physical injury is shown to have resulted, overlooking the
fact that thereby a legal injury has been proved, and the
only question that remains is, whether it is the legal consequence of the wrong; and that the fright is alleged and
proved, solely in order to make out through it, such connection between them.
In Victoria R. R. v. Coultas, the court says, that if the

plaintiff were allowed to recover, then "not only in a case lile
the present but in every case where negligence has given a
person a serious nervous shock there might be-a claim for
damages on account of the mental injury." This decision
'"c147 Pa. 40 (1892).
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proceeded upon the same inability, as that in Mitchell v.
R. R., to distinguish between fright, alleged as the injury,
the substantive ground of action, and fright flred and
proved merely as a necessary link in the chain of causation,
and so to perceive how it is possible to refuse recovery when
fright, itself no legal damage, is 'the only injury proved,
and to allow it, where physical injury be shown to result
from fright, and so legal damage is established, The same
error exists in Ewing v. R. R., where the court says 35 : "The
injury proceeds from mental shock alone, there is no allegation that she had received any bodily injury, and if mere
fright unaccompanied by bodily injury is a cause of action,
the scope of

.

.

.

accident cases will be very greatly

enlarged. In fact she has alleged in her declaration, and as
the case came up on demurrer, her allegations must be taken
to be true, that she did in consequence of the fright suffer
a permanent physical disablement." The court must mean
by bodily injury a direct physical impact.
The court citing Wood's note to Mayne on 'Damages38
says that it knows no case where mere fright unaccompanied
by bodily injury has been held actionable. Here, however,

there is bodily injury which while not contemporaneous with
the fright accompanies it in the sense that it is its necessary
consequence. There must- be physical injury to give a 'right,
of action. Mental suffering to be Oe subject of. compensation must be referable to the same wrongful act which causes
the injury and so, itself, becomes actionable. This is the
sense of legal connection, in which the suffering must accompany the injury. It may and often does follow the
physical injury as an after consequence.
The second reason is, that the damage is too remote.
The proximate consequences being said to be in Mitchell v.
R. R. (Supra) : "all the ordinary results of the act whici.
are usual and, therefore, may be expected; while here, the
physical injuries are the result of an unusual combination of
circumstances, which could not have been anticipated, and
over which defendant had no control and hence too remote."
Laying aside the question of whether under this very
Per Curiarn, Paxson being, Ch. J.
See notes 21 and 22, p. 144.
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definition the injury was not the "usual" and natural result
of frightening a woman, 37 and, therefore, to be expected, the
definition itself is against the current of authority not merely
generally, but more narticularly of the New York Court
itself. In Erghott v. Mayo, 37a it is expressly held that the
liability for admitted or proven negligence is not to be restricted to those results which the defendant might have an3
b
ticipated as reasonably probable; while in Tice v. Mum1,
the plaintiff's pregnancy was held not to be an intervening
independent agent breaking the chain of cause and effect between a negligent act, and a miscarriage resulting therefrom.
In Coultas v. R. R. it is said: "Such a consequence would
not in the ordinary course of things flow from the gatekeeper's negligence,"-that is true, more often the woman
would be struck and killed-"and so the damage is too
remote." If by this is meant that the precise mode in which
injury has resulted was improbable, it is true; but if some
injury be probable, it is not necessary that the precise form
and manner of its occurrence can be foreseen, it is'enough
if it happen naturally, assisted by noihing but ordinary
natural forces, and who can say that this result is unnatural?
What unusual force is there to which the injury can be
ascribed as an intervening agent? Such a limitation would
bar recovery in innumerable cases, when in England the
plaintiff has been allowed to recover. 3s
In Ewing v. R. R., the court relies on the rule originated
by Paxson, C. J.. in Hoag v. R. R.3s1 defining legally proximate consequences as "those which under the surrounding
circumstances might and ought to have been foreseen." a rule
often reiterated by him, often applied without qualification
'There being always necessarily a certain number of women in
every community in the plaintiff's condition.
'a 96 N. Y. 264 (1884).
b 94 N. Y. 621 (1883).

"*Clark v. Chambers, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 365; Boyce v. Jones, x Starkie
493 (I816), and the many cases where the accident has occurred by the
plaintiff's, or some other person's or animal's, action under the influence of the impending danger.
wa8 5 Pa. 283 (1877).
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(and properly) when the question in hand was the negligence of the act, always varied (with equal propriety), in
every case where negligence is proved or admitted to exist
by holding that the wrongdoer "ought" to foresee all that
may occur in the ordinary sequence of natural cause and
effect 3" and is thus in effect liable for all the natural results
of his act, though in advance improbable.
Even these reasons seem to leave the courts unsatisfied, so
in Mitchell v. R. R. the additional reason is given that "Public Policy forbade opening a door to actions so easy to fabricate," and where damages are so speculative. They overlook this, that the act done must be one likely to cause actual
harm, that the physical injury exists, and is as capable of
certain proof as if it followed direct impact, and that at the
present time medical testimony can establish the connection
between the shock and the injury, with at least as great certainty as it can trace the physical after-effects of a direct
physical impact. That the damages would be speculative if
the fright or mental suffering were the only injury alleged,
will of course be admitted, but here there is actual injury
which is capable of accurate valuation with equal certainty
whatever the manner, in which it was caused. In fact the
error of considering the action as brought to recover for the
fright as -an injury, and not for the physical injuries themselves as the ground of action permeates the entire decision.
That there is no duty upon defendant to plotect plaintiff
from fright is advanced in Ewing v. R. R. as an additional
reason. The court even went so far as to say that "the
detendant (a railway corporation) only owes her the duty
not to do that which in an individual would amount to an
assaultoa or her tjerson." This is so novel a doctrine as to
corporate liability for negligence that serious criticism may
be postponed till it rests on some better authority than a
per curiam opinion, even of a court of last resort.
" Oil City v. Robinson, 99 Pa. 1 (I881); Haverly v. R. R., i35 Pa.
5o (189o) ; Hogsett v. Bunting, 139 Pa. 363 (i8go). See also AmFIcUAN
LAw REGisTE, March, i9ox, Vol. 4o, N. S., p. 118.
Wa The court must have meant battery. The gist of assault is subjectirig the plaintiff to a reas§oria-le fear of violence and if the word
were intentionally used. would lay down a measure of liability far
in excess of anything claimed by the plaintiff.
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"Nor," the court then says, "had it (the defendant) any
reason to anticipate that the result of a collision on its road
would so operate in the mind of a person who switnessed it,
but who sustained no bodily injury thereby, as to produce
such nervous excitement or distress as to result in permanent
injury, and if the injury could not have been so foreseen
it was not proximate."
The crucial error in the court's reasoning is a misconception, leading to an entire misstatement of the facts.
The shock which caused the injuries came not from the
distress and fright incident to witnessing the collision, but
was the result of the fall of wreckage, in this case a car,
upon the house, probably a flimsy shanty, in which she sat;
she probably never knew what caused the concussion which
shocked her until later. It is undoubted that the company
owes no duty to bystanders to run their trains so as not to
wound their feelings by causing them to witness a collision,
but that it owes no duty to a person living in a house or
shanty immediately adjoining its tracks to avoid oversetting
their cars upon such house is quite a different propositionIt was mere chance that she was injured through the action
of nervous shock and not by direct impact and it is inconceivable that such a claim would have been advanced had the
plaintiff been actually struck by the car, and yet in each case
the duty and the breach of it .would have been the same.
Were the facts as stated there was no negligence because
no duty to take care to avoid frightening the plaintiff, so of
course no matter what the results might be, the defendant
being guilty of no wrong could not be held liable, as in the
case of Fox v. Borkey;39b cited in the opinion where the act,
blasting some distance from plaintiff's property, had no tendency to cause the plaintiff any inconvenience other than
fright and so it was properly held there was no right to recover even though through fright a serious physical injury
had resulted.
40
A case very similar to Fox, v. Borkey is Braun v. Craven,
in which the alleged negligence was that the defendant
lb 126 Pa. 164 (1889).
,o 175 II. 410 (1898).
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entered a room with rubber overshoes on, the plaintiff's back
being turned, and spoke sharply and angrily, and thereby
frightened the plaintiff in consequence of which she became
ill. The court disposes of the whole case in one sentence
of a twenty-page opinion: "It could not have been reasonably anticipated

that any injury therefrom could rea-

sonably have resulted;" in a word, the defendant's conduct was not negligent. Unfortunately the court, not content
with this, stated the following: "Terror and fright even if it
results in nervous shock which constitutes a physical injury
does not create a liability" mere dictum and true if it mean
that no act is wrongful if only likely to cause fright: but
quite erroneous if it is construed to mean that one guilty of
an act likely to cause actual injury may escape liability for
physical injury caused thereby. because the effect of fright
on the physical system is one of the intermediate causes.
So in Spade v. R. R. the facts were such as to present the
question of the existence of negligence. The plaintiff, a
female passenger, was startled and disgusted, and as she
claimed in consequence rendered seriously and permanently
ill by a very slight contact with a drunken fellow passenger,
whom the conductor was endeavoring to eject. The only
proof of negligence in such ejection was the fact that the
drunken man touched her. Was it negligence not to have
taken care to prevent such a contact? That was the vital
question really involved. It was if the conductor was "bound
to anticipate and guard against" any probable injury as
likely to attend such contact. Was any injury probable?
Fright was undoubtedly probable, but could the conductor
anticipate any serious after-consequences thereof? They
have actually occurred, but the question is should they have
been anticipated and guarded against? The eourt argues at
length that "the general conduct of business, and the ordinary affairs of life must be done on the assumption that persons to be affected thereby are not peculiarly sensitive, and
are of ordinary physical and mental strength." "One may
be held bound to anticipate and guard against the probable
consequences to ordinary people, but to carry the rule further
imposes an undue measure of responsibility upon those
guilty only of unintentional (?) negligence."
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"The rule, therefore, 'is just which limits responsibility
in such cases to the natural and probable consequences of
"
the act," citing many cases. 1
"Hill Y. HWiu-sor, iiS Mass. 251 (i875), and Lynn Gas Co. v. Ins. Co.,
158 Mass. 570 (1893), directly contra. Not one of the cases cited necessarily decides that there is any principle of law restricting liability for
the consequences of an admittedly negligent act to the results reasonably
probable when the act was done.
In W1hite v. Dresser. 135 Mass. 15o (1883), the wrong was removal
of lateral support: held that "nothing in the nature of the injury to the
plaintiff's property involved injury to his feelings," nor did the circum-

stances attending it give him right to damages therefor (as in the nature
of punitive damages though not co noinine).
In Fillibro-wn v. Hoar, 124 Mass. 58o (1878).

it was held that a

wrongful eviction did involve "injury to his feelings by reason of the
indignity and insult of being turned out of his home with his family, but
not injuries to his health from a journey to his father's house two
days later, nor from grief at his family's illness."
In Lonibard v. Lcnnorx. 155 Mass. 70 (i89x), it was held that mental

suffering was ail ordinary and natural result of a slander and was an
item for compensation.
In Derry v. Flitner, 18 Mass. 131 (1875), the wrong complained of
wa. a bare infringement of an exclusive franchise, no injury was threatened save by the intervention of such a storm as did assist in causing the
loss of plaintiff's vessel. Therefore no injury was probable unless the
storm was to be expected, and the only wrong would have been to the
plaintiff's property in his franchise. Also here, the storm, if of a sort
not to be expected in that climate, would have been an "act of God,"
breaking chain of natural sequence.
In Notting Hill, L. R., 9 Probate Div. 105 (1884), the question was
whether the negligent ship was liable to the owner of a cargo for loss of
a market by delay owing to collision. This case was decided on the
authority of The Parana,L. R., 2 P. D. 118 (1877). A case of contract
(Brett, M. R., saying there was no difference in the measure of damages in tort and contract) which went upon the difference between goods
carried by land and sea; the one being designed for immediate sale, and
so the loss of the market being a natural loss capable of being proved
with reasonable certainty, the other being liable either to be sold while on
ship or perhaps not for months after landing, the loss of market being
thus, on account of the character of the thing and voyage, mere matter of
speculation and conjecture depending not on the delay, but on the owner's
choice of action as to the sale of his goods. It would seem that where
goods are accepted under a contract to be carried, the character of the
goods or purposes for which designed, so far as it may affect the
quantum of loss, is fixed by the terms of contract; the extent of the duty
of safe carriage is settled by reasons of public policy in the absence of
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The court admits that the injury in question may be
proximate, and so holding, they are forced to look to some
other reason save remoteness. They rely, therefore, on public policy, the inconvenience of administering a rule granting recovery. It is the proximate result of the act, but as
their argument clearly shows the act was not negligent because no reasonable man could have anticipated any result
but perhaps fright, and fright while it may as they say often
be a real, not a fanciful injury, is never a legal 42 injury. So in
truth the conductor was not "merely" negligent, he was not
negligent at all unless some legal injury was "obviously
44
probable" 43 to the normal msn as the result of his act.
To require more would be to impose a duty of observing
contractual restriction and is primarily a common law liability redressable by an action of tort; the carrier being liable to answer for all
damage resulting naturally (though at the time of the wrongful act
buch result could not be foreseen) to goods of such character. or
designed for such uses as is ascertained by the circumstances surrounding the contract for carriage.
2 For the reason given (p. i44) while it may be real, it is generally in
a vast majority of cases fanciful, and so is unimportant in the eye of the
law which regards the general condition and not the exceptional case.
'In Hill v. Winsor, ui8 Mass. 256, the test is said to be: "If injury
in some form was obviously probable to plaintiff the defendant's act was
negligent. It is not necessary that injury in the precise form in which
*t resulted should have been foreseen, it is enough if it now appear
natural and probable"'; see remarks on this statement, Vol. 4o, N. S.,
AMERIcAN LAW REGISTER, p. 85.
"The active efficient cause that sets in motion a train of events which
brings about a result without the intervention of any force started and
working actively from a new and independent cause, is the direct and
proximate ca.use referred to in those cases," i. e., of liability for negligent acts.
Knowlton, J., Lynn Gas Co. v. Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 57o, at p. 574.
"Upon the retrial of the case, 172 Mass. 499, Holmes, C. J., intimated
the opinion that such inconveniences were the ordinary expectable incidents of travel, the risk of which every passenger must be taken to
have assumed. "To keep the car free from obnoxious persons is the
defendant's right and its duty to the plaintiff and the other passengers."
Carriers of passengers owe the same degree of care (in the performance
of such duty) as in respect to construction and'management of their
vehicles, but if that care be shown, any injury is probably inevitable
accident. As to whether there was negligence in the manner of expelling the drunken man

.

.

. it has not been pointed out to us," p. 490.
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a measure of care practically equivalent to that of answering for all the results which may happen to flow from one's
acts though in advance no harm could have been anticipated,
in a word for every one to act at his peril. Admittedly an
impossible standard for human action.
If he had been negligent,-and all negligence is by the
very terms of its definition "unintentional" and "mere,"-he
has been guilty of an act wrongful because likely to cause
injury, and he cannot escape liability because he could not
foresee the precise extent of it or the precise mode in which it
would occur.
The language used is appropriate to the question presented. Public policy and convenience forbid the imposition of a duty to avoid acts likely to cause fright alone, but"
all the considerations of public policy are satisfied by requir-.
ing no precautions greater than those reasonably necessary
to prevent material injury under normal conditions, they
cannot require that wlien" the act is negligent because it
threatens actual injury, that actual injury sustained in one
particular way shall not be redressed while that suffered in
every other manner, no more proximately connected with the
act or naturally flowing from it, must be compensated.
The court excepts "cases where an intent to cause mental
distress is shown or is reasonably to be inferred, as for example in cases of seduction, slander, malicious prosecution
or arrest and some others. Nor do we include cases done
with gross carelessness or recklessness, showing utter indifference to such consequences when they must have been
in the actor's mind."
If this means that in such case mental suffering alone will
support an action it is quite inaccurate;45 if it means it is
' In slander when special damage must be shown, such suffering is
not sufficient; as in all other cases of tort, the distress naturally produced by the wrong may be considered as an item in computing the
amount of compensation to be a-rarded. So in seduction, that a cause
of action may be proved, no matter how aggravated the case, the father
must show material idamage by showing a loss of his daughter's services, the daughter must be incapacitated from rendering service either
by pregnancy or some illness directly caused by the act of seduction, and
the girl must be in the father's service, both at the time of the wrong,
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allowed to be considered by the jury as an item of compensation when other damage is shown, it stands )n exactly the
same footing as such suffering accompanying any physical
injury caused by negligent or intentional wrong. Probably
the court has in mind the rule peculiar to Massachusetts,
that while the defendant's actual wicked intent to injure can
not be directly punished by the imposition of punitive
damages eo nomize, a practically identical recovery is given
as compensation for the sense of outrage caused to the plaintiff by such intent to injure. The same thought probably
led to the exception of cases of gross negligence or recklessness, but surely the court cannot mean to intimate that
the grossness or recklessness of the negligence can do away
with the necessity of proving a resulting injury; to so hold
would be to give a right of action to punish moral wrong
not to compensate for legal injury, be the damage called
what the court may please, punitive or compensatory for the
outrage to plaintiff's feeling. In tort, a malicious intention
cannot make an act wrongful which inflicts no injury to a
legal right. 40 The only case 47 which deals with fright intentionally inflicted is rested squarely on the ground that the
fright to which the defendant intentionally subjected the
plaintiff, was one so serious as to obviously threaten actual
physical injury, and that it thus became a wrong to her right
to personal safety, and where physical injury did result, was
actionable. If by gross negligence is meant an act which
threatened actual injury, and not fright merely, then the
decision would fall in line with Phillinore,J.'s4" statement in
Dulicu v. White, that the question is not one of remoteness,
but the existence of a duty.
The cases allowing recovery proceed on the broad principle
the seduction, the injury and the consequent illness-then, and only
then, can his distress and shame be a subject for compensation.
In malicious prosecution and arrest an absolute right is invaded; no
damage other than the infringement of the right need be shown.
Therefore, where such infringement is shown, the damages are at once
at large for the jury and include all the inherent distress caused.
'4 Allen v. Flood, L. R. 1898, I A. C., I.
".Downton v. Wilkinson, L. R., I897, 2 Q. B. 57.

L. R. 2 Q. B., ipoi, 684.
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that an action lies to recover for legal i. e. material injury
resulting proximately from a willful or negligent wrong.
In i-avtr
v. R. R.,4sa there was a collision negligent as to
all passengers.but the plaintiff was not thrown from his seat,
nor was the grasp of his hands thereon loosened, the only
direct result to him of the tremendous shaking up which he
received was a violent nervous shock, which resulted in
paraiysis. It was held that the paralysis was the proximate
result-'" of the negligent act and so actionable, rejecting the
argument that rccovery' in such case is against public policy.
In Mack v. R. R.," ' the S. C. of South Carolina allowed
a recovery for physical injury, when the only direct consequence was fright on the ground that the act was wrongful,
and the injury proximate, in that it flowed naturally from
the wrong. without the intervention of any new independent
cause. citing all the previous decisions.
In Sloae v. R. R.A9b the court intimated its opinion,
merely dictuni, as there was an undoubted injury apart
from any mental suffering or physical effect thereof, and
they were only proved as aggravation-items of damage
to increase the amount of compensation-that physical injury sustained through the medium of fright or mental or
nervous shock is actionable damage; saying: "a nervous
shock is distinct from mental anguish and falls within the
pliysiological rather than the _psychological branch ef the
human organism." This is much the same thought as that
of Palles, C. B., in Bell v. R. R.4 9 "Such a result," sudden
'a 9 3 Tex. 239 (I9OO).
' Such as "ought, in the light of the attending circumstances, to have
been foreseen as a natural and probable consequence." Compare rule in
Hoag v. R. R., quoted in Ewing v. R. R., suepra. But the court then
says: "In the light of common knowledge can a court say as matter of
law that strong mental emotion may not produce in the subject bodily
or mental injury?" In fact the legal probabilities are not what an
average man would foresee, but what an ideal person with his mind
directed to all the effects which in the course of nature might result,
ought to foresee; in a word the test, the limit of liability, are the natural
not the probable consequences.
*'a29 S. E. R. 905 (898).

lb ni Cal. 669 (i896).
'C26 Ir. Rep. 213 (I89O).

4
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physical change from fright, "must be regarded ai, an
injury to the body rather than the mind." This dictum is
instructive and has much of truth in it, but it is unnecessary
that nervous shock be considered a direct physical injury
for as Palles, C. B. points out, if an injury is proximate,
where it occurs at once, it cannot be too remote in the absence of any adequate intervening cause, if the same injury
results after an appreciable lapse of time (in the Bell case
two weeks and more), from the same wrong. As well
might it be said there would be no murder by poison if the
victim did not die at once.
In Dulieu v. White

& Sons, 4 9d

the plaintiff's declaration

set forth that she was sitting in the bar of her husband's
public house, when the defendant's servant negligently drove
a two-horse van into the room where she sat and "in consequence she sustained a severe shock and was and is seriously
ill and gave premature birth to a child." The case came up
on the defence that the statement disclosed no cause of
action, the damages being too remote. This is the modern
substitute under the Practice Act for demurrer.
Kennedy, J., in an elaborate opinion holds that the plaintiff can recover.,
In negligence the plaintiff has to prove resulting damage
and "a natural and continuous sequence connecting
the
' '49
breach of duty with the damage as cause and effect.

e

As to the existence of the duty there is no question.
"The driver of a van on the highway owes a duty to use
reasonable care so as not to injure persons lawfully using
the highway, property adjoining it, or person like the plaintiff lawfully occupying such property." In considering the
question. "since it comes up on demurrer50 we must take it
as proved that the negligent driving reasonably and naturally caused a nervous 51 or mental shock and that the premature child-birth was the natural result thereof."
I'd L.

P 19o, 2 K. B. 669.

te Shearinan & Redfield, cited in Bevan Negligence in Law, 2d Ed.

P.7.
"As in Ewing v. R. R., x47 Pa. 4o, but how different the attitude of
that court.
1
"Nervous" is probably the more correct epithet where terror
operates on the physical organism to produce bodily injury.
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"It is argued that fright caused by negligence is not
in itself a cause of action. Mitchell v. R. R."
"If negligence has caused me neither injury to my propertv nor physical mischief, but only an unpleasant emotion
of more or less transient duration, an essential ingredient
of a right of action in negligence is lacking. Fear, as Sir
F. Pollock says, taken alone falls short of being actual
damage, not because it is a remote or unlikely consequence,
but because it can be proved and measured only by physical

effects. '

52

"Direct bodily impact, it may be truly said, without resulting damage is as insufficient a ground of legal claim as
fright. That fright cannot be a ground of action in absence
of accompanying impact is both unreasonable and contrary to authority. Leaving out Dowitton v. Wilkinson, a
case of willful wrong, and the criminal cases cited by Beven,
p. 81-2, Jones v. Bovce,P2 a Harrisv. Mobbs,52b and Wilkins
v. Day,52, go far to negative such claim. In the first, the
fright to the passenger, in the others to the horses, ought to
be regarded as the direct and immediate cause of the damage."
Perhaps it is hyper-criticism to suggest that after all in
neither of these cases nor in that in hand is the fright the
ground of action. The physical injury is the damage
alleged, and the fright
in all the cases is "but a link in the
53
chain of causation."
"The results here being physical are as measurable in
damages as the same res:tlts would be if they arose from
actual impact." 54

"There is one limitation

.

.

.

the

shock must arise from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to ofieself." "There is no legal duty not to shock
B.'s nerves by the exhibition of negligence toward C. or the
'Here

is an allusion to one of the reasons why such harm is not

legal injury, the difficulty of legal proof. See ante, p. 143.
"a i Starkie, 493 (I816).
'b L. tR 3 Ex. D. 268 (1878).
12 Q. B. D. no-go (1883).

52

Phillimore, p. 684.
See Mitchell v. R. R., supra, p. i55, where difficulty of assessing
damages is stated as a reason for refusing recovery.
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property of B. or C.," citing Smith v. Johnson,55 where a man
was made ill by seeing another negligently killed. "As the
defendant neither intended to affect the plaintiff injuriously
nor did anything which could reasonably or naturally be
expected (to do so), there was no evidence of the breach of
any legal duty toward the plaintiff," in a word, as to the
plaintiff, defendant was not negligent.
In fine, the injury
must he the natural result of an act negligent to plaintiff, as
"causing him reasonable fear of personal injury." An act
negligent because threatening him with actual and so legal
injury. There is no negligence if actual injury be not
threatened: there is no duty to avoid acts likely to cause
fright only.
So there being negligence, if actual injury ensue not
remotely but proximately there is a right to recover.
'Is there any reason why physical injury which follows
naturally nervous shock is less proximate in a legal sense
5' 7
than that which arises contemporaneously.
"As well might it be said that a death caused by poison
is not to be attributed to the person who administered it,
because the death is not contemporaneous with its administration. 5 s Remoteness means not severance in poivt of
time, bitt the absence of direct and natural causal scq1li1we,
of a natural or necessary- descent from the wrong to the
damage."
The injury to health which forms the main ground for
damages in actions of negligence is frequently proved as a
sequel not concomitant of the occurrence.
"As to the claim in Victoria R. R. v. Coultas. that if an
action lay there it would in every case of mere serious nervous fright." he says. "but actual physical injury was there
'Unreported, a case similar to Spade v. R. R.. the facts supposed
by the court to exist in Ewing v. R. R.
" As in Brann v. Craven, Fox v. Borkey. and Spade v. R. R.
" "I should not like to assume that it is scientifically true that nervous
shock which causes serious bodily injury is not actually accompanied by
physical in'Jury, though impossible to detect in living subject." See
similar statement, Sloane v. R. R., in Cal. 667.

" Palles, C.

B., 26 L. R. Ir. 439.
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established by jury's verdict, which if unsupported by the
evidence should have been set aside on motion for new
trial."
As to Mitchell v. R. R., that it was error to say as matter
of law that the injuries plainly result from an unusual and
accidental combination of circumstances. This is for the
jury; if such injuries are not proximate, how are those in
Jones v. Boyce?"9 True, Mrs. Mitchell was pregnant, and
her injuries were thus increased; but it is no answer to say
that a man run over by negligence, would have suffered less,
had he not hTd an unusually thin skull or weak heart."
Suppose in the Mitchell case, the plaintiff had been struck,
would the court have refused her compensation for her miscarriage? If not, they must consider the damage not too
remote. As to Spade v. R. R., he says: "If it is adrriitted
that such damage is not too remote in principle to be recoverable at law, I should be sorry to bar all such claims on
ground of policy alone to prevent the possible success of
groundless actions. Such a course involves a denial of
redress in meritorious cases and shows a certain degree of
distrust which I do not share in the capacity of legal
tribunals to get at the truth in this class of cases."
Pfhillimore. J. reached the same conclusion though by
a different process of reasoning. He says: "There may be a
duty owed by A. to B., not to inflict a mental shock on
him," citing cases of Jones v. Boyce and Downton v. Wilkiuson. "To give cause of action the act which terrifies must
be either willful or negligent."
As between people traveling on the highway, "it is not
certain that there is any duty to conduct oneself, so as not to
frighten others, only so as not to cause collision or some
other form of direct personal injury."
He also says: "There are dangers to the crossing the
Strand at Charing Cross that might frighten the coolest
man, but if physical injury followed such fright, it may be
there is no cause of action." It may be a person venturing on
'In
Twombly v. 1. R., 69 N. Y. I58, the same principle is carried
still further: plaintiff, a passenger, reasonably fearing a collision,
jumped out and was injured. The collision being avoided, he alone was

hurt.

He recovered damages for his injury.
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the streets takes his chance of terrors,0° but here the plaintiff was in her husband's house where she had a right, in
fact was under a duty to be, and where she had the right to
personal safety. 61
So as to Victoria Co. v. Coultas and Mitchell v. R. R.,
he says: The defendant's servants were careless, and they
would have been liable had actual impact occurred, 2 even
in consequence of a wrong manoeuvre induced by fright,
"but it may be that they are not liable if impact be escaped
however narrowly."
In Spade v. R. R. the plaintiff being a passenger, "the
company owed her no duty to take care not to frighten her,
she having assumed such risk; aliter in the case of the occupier of adjacent premises."
Finally he says: "The difficulty in my mind is not as to
the remoteness of damage but the uncertainty of there being
any duty. Once get the duty and physical damage following the breach of duty, the fact of one link in the chain of
causation being mental only makes no difference."
If to
this be added that part of Mr. Justice Kennedy's opinion
dealing with the existence and extent of the duty, the
result would be a statement of a rule safe, just, practical
and accurate.*
Unfortunately Phillimore, J., seems to conceive that the
duty must be to avoid acts likely to cause fright, and that
the negligence of an act is to be determined not by the
inherent tendency to cause harm but by its natural consequnces.
Downton v. Wilkinson did not decide that there was any
right to personal safety, in the sense of safety from personal
distress, fright or inconvenience or injury of any sort other
than that which is tangible, material, bodily.
The defendant intended to create a fright so severe as to
be obviously calculated to cause serious physical results.
'See Spade v. R. R., 172 Mass. 488, where same thought is more
accurately expressed by Holmes, C. J.
"tIn the sense in which he understood Wright, J., in Downton v.
Wilkinson.
"In
Victoria v. Coultas the court expressly refused to express an
opinion as to whether actual impact was necessary.
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The act was wrongful, not as Phillimore says, because
the defendant had destroyed the plaintiff's personal safety
and thereby caused physical injury to her, but the act was
wrongful because intentionally an act was done likely to
cause her physical injury, and so affect her right to personal
safety.
There is no duty to avoid acts likely only to cause ordinary fright to the public generally, because the effect of
fright on the average person is trivial, and serious results
cannot be anticipated, but to do an act intended 3 to cause
fright of a peculiarly severe nature, or to a particular sensitive class is wrongful because, and only because one who
does so might and must realize that such a fright, or any
fright to such persons will probably cause actual bodily
harm.
In Jo.es v. Boyce the ;act was wrongful, not because it
did frighten the plaintiff and so infringe his right to "personal safety," and cause him to act to his physical hurt, but
because when it was done, it had a probable tendency to
cause him physical injury in some way; had no injury
resulted it would not have ceased to be negligence; injury
is not necessary to make an act wrongful, it is, however, of
course necessary to make the wrong actionable.
In negligence, the duty is not to prevent, certain results
but not to act in a way likely to cause certain results.Not to
insure against certain injuries, but to take precautions 'to
prevent such injuries. The negligence of an act depends
upon whether the normal man would foresee that from it,
injury would probably result to some person or class of persons. Phillimore, 5., in his criticism of Victoria v. Coultas,
seems to think that the legal quality of a careless act is held
in suspense. after the actor has lost all control over the event,
to await the consequence; if a certain species of damage occur
the act is wrongful, if another, it is perfectly proper. In
truth the negligence of the act depends on its tendency to
" Or probably one necessarily causing such fright, though with the
limitation that great public businesses cannot be carried on with respect
to the safety of exceptionally sensitive persons. The necessities of the
prompt transaction of business outxeighs the safety of a class so small
in numbers. See Spade v. R. R., 172 Mass. 288.
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do actual harm in some manner, not any particular species
of harm in any particular manner. The defendant's guilt
depends on his action not on its results. That only affects
the plaintiff's right to recover from him, if as a legal consequence a legal right of his is injured. That none results
is like the plea not possessed in trespass, or of truth in libel;
the act remains wrongful, but the plaintiff has shown no
right to the thing injured by the wrong.
As to the case of a person crossing the Strand at Charing
Cross, the right of action depends on the character of the
act, whether negligent or not, which occasioned the terror,
not on the fact that terror is the only direct consequence.
It is erroneous to say that a person on the highway takes
all the risk of the traffic; he does take the risks of traffic conducted with normal regard for his physical safety ;64 this
includes the risk of either collision or terror so caused, but
he does not assume the risk of any negligent act on the part
of those engaged in the traffic.
Traffic is conducted with due care, if all precautions are
taken ordinarily sufficient to prevent personal contact. No
precaution need be taken in addition thereto merely to avoid
causing fright. Nor is it accurate to say that those travelin- the highway owe the occupants of adjacent property any
higher duty than they owe to fellow-travelers; both are
entitled to such care as will protect them from bodily harm,
and no more; such occupant has no more right than a traveler
to ask for immunity from mental distress consequent on
the normal conduct of the customary traffic. He must put up
with all the inconveniences resulting from the location of
his property.
The case of Spade v. R. R. is misunderstood. The principle
is stated quite generally; there is nothing in the opinion to
limit it to passengers, or to indicate that carriers owe to them
any lesser duty than to occupier of adjacent premises.
Both expediency and the decided cases would indicate that
the carrier's duty of care to its passengers is of the highest
degree, falling but little short of that of insurers of safety;
" See Pollock on Torts. Webb's ed., p. 198, under head "Taking
risk."
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it may probably be safely said they do insure care in providing for the safety of their passengers. What the passenger
does accept are those risks and inconvenience inevitably
inseparable from any business even when carefully conducted;'; those dangers and distresses which no degree of
care reasonably to be required can avoid."0
In Purcellv. R. R.1 7 the defendant's act being negligent as
threatening material injury to the ordinary passenger and
not to some peculiarly sensitive passenger only, the plaintiff was allowed to recover, since actual injury had resulted
proximately to her; as Phillimore, J., said, "The fact of
one link in the chain of causation being mental only makes
no difference."
The defendant, a carrier of passengers, was guilty of an
act which as to the plaintiff, a passenger, was undoubtedly
negligent as subjecting her to the risk of grievous personal
injury or even death; it ran its car so carelessly that a collision with a railroad train was only escaped by the merest
good fortune ;"' by good luck she escaped direct impact, but
sustained a severe nervous shock, which caused, as according
to medical testimony it naturally would, a serious physical
illness.
The court, Gilfillan. C. J., says a duty of highest care is
shown, also "negligence as to that duty and if that negligence caused what the law regards as actionable injury the
action is well brought. Of course negligence without injury
gives no right of action." He then says, "It may be conceded that any effect on the mind alone would not furnish
a ground of action," but here he says there is a physical
injury as serious as breaking a leg. The only question is
whether the injury is the proximate result of defendant's
negligence.
What care is it to the public interest to require, is the question
which the court in Spade v. R. R., 168 Mass. 285. is discussing in the
passage quoted by Phillimore, J.
This is admirably expressed at some length by Holmes, C. J., when
the case again came up for review upon retrial, 172 Mass. 488.
'48 Minn. 134 (supra).
' Facts almost identical with those in Twombly v. R.
158 (supra).

R., 69 N. Y.
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"The only new independent cause69 which can possibly be said to intervene between the wrong is the plaintiff's
condition of mind, her fright. Now, if the fright was the
natural consequence of the defendant's negligence, and the
fright caused the nervous shock and convulsion, and consequent illness, the negligence was the proximate cause of the
injuries." "A mental condition or operation coming between
the negligence and injury does not necessarily break the
required sequence of intermediate causes," citing cases where
plaintiff's action under influence of sudden peril causes the
injury. He rejects also the argument that her pregnancy,
and not the defendant's negligence was the true cause of
her injury.
The decision ends by saying- the carrier might not be
liable to a peculiarly sensitive person for an injury caused by
an act or omission not negligent as to an ordinary passenger,
nor would he owe such person an.y higher duty of care than
to passengers generally.
Thus it is seen that all the cases refusing recovery are
based on one or more of the following reasons:
I. The basis of the action is the fright; the physical
injury is but proof of the severity of the fright and of the
extent of the resilting injury.7°
2. If recovery is allowed for physical injury caused by a
wrong through the medium of shock or suffering it is
impossible to refuse it where only shock or suffering result."1
3. That to allow recovery will end in requiring a degree
of care impossible to comply with and repugnant to all principles of public expedienjy. 2
4. It is against Public Policy; it is difficult to prove
except by plaintiff's testimony, which if admitted as a proper
"And by
wrong; by
adequate to
"Mitchell

independent is meant an agent not itself a product of the
intervening, intervening to cause a new result; an agent
bring about the injurious result.
v. R. R., i51 N. Y. io7. So also Ewing v. R. R., 147 Pa.

40; and Victoria Com. v. Coultas, L. IL, 13 A.. C. 222; Spade v. R. R.,
z68 Mass. 285.
'Same cases.
"Ewing v. R. R.; Spade v. R. R.; Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401
(89g).
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medium of proof, is almost impossible to controvert, and
73
it will encourage litigation.

5. It is too remote a consequence.7 4
In answer to these it may be said:
I. The fright is not the ground of action-the physical
injury is the damage alleged; the fright is but stated as indicating the causal connection between the wrong and the
injury. There is no greater reason in holding the fright
the substantive cause of action in such cases than in those
where the fright causes plaintiff or some other person or
75
animal to act to his detriment.
2. The recovery can be had where physical injury ensues,
for that is legal damage; not when only mental suffering
results, for that is not legal damage. Kennedy, J., Dulien v.
White; Purcell v. R. R.
3. This involves a confusion between the elements necessary to the existence of negligence, and the maintenance of
the action. Unless the act threaten legal injury, some
palpable material harm, it is not negligent; if it threaten
such harm it should be actionable if legal injury results
though the harm suffered occurred in a way not precisely to
be expected. Thus to allow a recovery cannot extend the
measure or scope of the care required to escape negligence.
No act will be considered negligence merely because in
fact it causes fright and injury through it, if it had no tendency to cause anything but fright. See Kennedy, J.'s statement that the shock must be the result of reasonable fear
of personal violence to plaintiff himself, and Gilfillan, C.
J., at end of opinion in Purcell v. R. R.
4. The physical injury can here be proved like any other,
by disinterested testimony, the causal connection by medical
testimony quite as accurately as many of the intricate
consequences of a physical impact, and that it encourages
litigation is equally applicable to the original allowance of
all the early actions on the case, it is the policy of the law
"Mitchell v. R. R.; Spade v. R. R.; Ewing v. R. R.
"Braun v. Craven; Mitchell v. R. R.; Ewing v. R. R.; R. R.

Coultas.

=Purcellv. R. R.; Hayter v. R. R.; Mack v. R. R.

v.
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to encourage
just litigation. See Kennedy, J., Dulieu v.
7
, hite. 5a
5. The injury is not too remote. The fact that the link
in the chain of causation is mental does not disturb the
orderly natural sequence of events.76 A mental condition
77
itself caused by the wrong is not an intervening agent.
Whether it has followed the shock naturally, and whether the
shock is the reasonable natural result of the negligence is
usually a question of fact for the jury.
"The relation between fright and injury to the nerve and
brain structures (and it may be added through them to other
parts of the body) is a matter which depends entirely upon
scientific and medical testimony, '7 just as do in fact the
relation to the wrong of many physical after-effects when
immediate impact occurs.
None of the objections urged being tenable it would seem
that recovery should be allowed on the fundamental principle
that where legal iniury has resulted proximately from a
wrong, there is always a right of action for damages.
Francis H. Bohlen.

